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Essay
Trade and Democratic Values
Frederick M. Abbott*
The attention of government was turned away from guarding against
the export of gold and silver to watch over the balance of trade as the
only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of
those metals. From one fruitless care it was turned away to another
care much more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally
fruitless.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) 1
The U.S. Congress stands at the threshold of defining
American trade policy for the twenty-first century. The results
of the North American Free Trade Area negotiations should be
placed before the Congress in 1992. The GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations will likely conclude in 1993 or 1994. Congress is
considering the customary extensions and amendments of trade
negotiating and administration authority. As it does so, there is
an intense pressure on the Congress to assume an active and di-
rect approach to the regulation of U.S. trade relations. This
pressure arises from diverse sources.
There is first the general state of the U.S. economy. The
rate of economic growth in 1992 is uncharacteristically low in
comparison to prior post-World War II economic expansions; too
low to reduce a persistently high rate of unemployment. 2 A sub-
* Frederick M. Abbott is an Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. University of California,
Berkeley, B.A. (1974); Yale Law School, J.D. (1977); University of California,
Berkeley, LL.M. (1989). The author is indebted to Professors David Caron,
David Gerber and Robert Hudec for comments on a draft of this essay.
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), republished in 39 BRITANNICA GREAT BOOKS 184
(1952).
2. See, e.g., Jobless Rate Dips a Notch to 77% in Mixed Showing, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992, at Al; Fed Downgrades the Nation's Business Prospects,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at C2; White House Is Ready for a Rosier Outlook,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at D1.
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stantial federal budget deficit3 is forecast and state budgets are
in poor condition.4 This generally unhealthy economic picture is
coupled with a significant balance of trade deficit.5
A second more specific set of pressures arises from indus-
tries which have been adversely affected by foreign competition
- most particularly the automobile industry, but similarly the
steel, textile and other industries. Prominent leaders of these
industries claim that foreign competitors take unfair advantage
of open U.S. markets.6 Intense lobbying to limit foreign access
to U.S. markets has yielded at least preliminary results in Con-
gress.7 Private antidumping and countervailing duty petitions
are proliferating.8
A third set of pressures arises from labor groups whose
members are affected by competition from foreign labor mar-
3. See U.S. Budget, Mid.Year Estimates Show Lower De1cit, Higher
Growth Rates, OMB Director Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) 143 (July
24, 1992). An Office of Management and Budget mid-year review of the federal
budget shows a projected deficit of $333.5 billion for fiscal 1992 and $341 billion
for fiscal 1993. The economic growth projection for 1992 is 2.7 percent.
4. See, e.g., States'Strained Finances Reveal Recession's Toll, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 1992, at B6. This report, based on a study by the National Conference of
State Legislatures, indicates that "states are in worse fiscal condition than they
were after any of the five previous national recessions, and.., they report that
the 1993 fiscal year looks bleak."
5. In April and May of 1992, the merchandise trade deficits of the United
States were $6.97 billion and $7.38 billion, respectively. See U.S. Trade Deficit
Soars 25 Percent in April, Commerce Department Reports, 9 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1084 (June 24, 1992); May Trade Deficit Up 4.5 Percent in Third
Monthly Rise, Says Commerce, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1253 (July 22, 1992).
In 1991 the total U.S. merchandise trade deficit was $66 billion. See irfra text
accompanying note 42.
6. See, e.g., Lee Iacocca, O.K, O.K., Call Me a Protectionist, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1991, § 4, at 17; Blunt Talk by Iacocca, Just Back from Japan, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1992, § 1, at 33.
7. The Trade Expansion Act of 1992 (HR 5100) passed by the House of
Representatives on July 8, 1992, would, inter alia, require the United States to
negotiate an agreement with Japan in which that country would agree to volun-
tarily limit its automobile exports to the United States, as well as require cars
produced in U.S.-based factories of Japanese car makers to have 70 percent U.S.
content by 1994. See House Passes Comprehensive Trade Bill with Limit on
Imports of Japanese Autos, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1204 (July 15, 1992). On
July 31, 1992, the House of Representatives passed a bill (HR 4318) that would
reclassify minivans as trucks for tariff purposes and thereby sharply increase
the applicable tariff. It appears that most European-produced minivans would
be exempt and that the measure would principally affect Japanese-produced
imports. See House Passes Bill that Will Increase Tariffs on Minivans; Veto
Threatened, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), Aug. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Itrade
Library, BNABTD File.
8. See, e.g., Steel Firms File 84 Countervailing Duty, Dumping Petitions
Against 21 Countries, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1162 (July 8, 1992).
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kets, principally in developing countries.9 A fourth and final set
of pressures arises from environmental interest groups which
seek to preserve a vital global environment. 10
This essay concerns the fundamental principles that will
guide congressional deliberations regarding trade policy in the
coming months and years. There is no question but that Con-
gress must respond effectively to progressive social demands,
such as demands that the environment not be sacrificed to an
unbridled adherence to the concept of free trade. At the same
time, Congress must not lose sight of certain fundamental prin-
ciples that have guided U.S. trade policy since the Second World
War. The underlying commitment of the United States to lib-
eral trade policy is not based on a simplistic commitment to com-
parative advantage as an end in itself, but is deeply rooted in a
commitment to democratic values. At the close of the Second
World War, the United States rejected central government eco-
nomic planning and broke the government-industrial alliances
that had dominated pre-war Germany and Japan. Despite the
apparent success of the liberal global trading system established
at the close of the war, there is, at this particular juncture in
history, perhaps the most intense demand in the United States
for trade protective measures since the 1930s.
Legislative enactment of import quotas and measures with
equivalent effect represents the division of markets among
producers, in effect establishing an international cartel arrange-
ment (under the auspices of international governmental agree-
ment). The division of markets by and among competitors and
potential competitors is precisely the problem to which competi-
tion law is addressed. Moreover, inherent in the formation of a
federal government-industrial alliance to manage U.S. trade re-
lations is a restriction of the decision-making sphere and influ-
ence of the individual. Such restriction would constitute a
threat to democratic values.
Before allowing itself to be persuaded that a hands-on ap-
proach to industrially-oriented trade management will serve the
9. See, e.g., Testimony of Owen Bieber, President of the United Automo-
bile Workers, before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Pro-
tection and Competitiveness on HR 4100 (the Trade Enhancement Act of 1992),
Federal Info. Sys. Corp., Mar. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
CURRNT File.
10. For a report on some of the trade-related activities of environmental
interest groups in 1991, see Frederick Abbott, International Trade Rules, World
Market Conditions and Environmental Effects, in 2 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 227
(1992).
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national interest, Congress should consider the lessons of his-
tory. Although a persuasive textbook case might be made for
managed trade, central government control over trade has con-
sistently resulted in dramatic economic and social failure, or eco-
nomic success coupled with social conditions that would be
intolerable in the United States.
The liberal trading system must become more responsive to
the interests of the environment and human well-being. It is ca-
pable of being adapted to meet the demands of the twenty-first
century. This essay offers a few modest suggestions as to how
this goal might be accomplished. The central message of this es-
say, however, is that adherence to the underlying principles of
the liberal trading system and the accomplishment of progres-
sive social goals are not mutually exclusive. It is imperative that
progressive social goals not be confused with the interests of in-
dustries that have failed to respond to international competition.
I. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
The liberal trading system is grounded in economic theory,
but theory did not give rise to the present structure of interna-
tional trade relations. The present international trade regime
arose from the ashes of the Second World War as part of a tri-
umvirate of new international institutions. The Second World
War was the watershed event in human history that led to a fun-
damental rethinking of the bases of international relations. The
most manifest defect in pre-war thinking - the lingering belief
that international disputes might be settled by resort to arms -
was addressed by creation of the United Nations. The United
Nations was designed to preserve the minimum world public or-
der necessary for political, economic and social progress.
The war left the economies of Europe in shambles." Eco-
nomic uncertainty in the pre-war years had contributed to the
rise of the Axis governments which ultimately led their nations
to war.'2 The severely restrictive trade policies of Western Eu-
rope and the United States after World War I had exacerbated
the slide into global economic depression which preceded the
11. A comprehensive description of the economic conditions in post-war
Europe can be found in EUROPEAN CUSTOMS UNION STUDY GROUP, GENERAL
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (1948) [hereinafter GENERAL REPORT].
12. Harold Lasswell, an American social scientist, wrote in 1935 with stun-
ning foresight of the potential in Europe for authoritarian government and ag-
gression based on economic uncertainty. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD
POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935).
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war.13 Architects of the post-war international order were com-
mitted not only to avoiding the economic policies which contrib-
uted to war,14 but were deeply committed to democratic values.'5
These leaders believed that the establishment of democratic in-
stitutions in the defeated Axis countries would provide the best
long-term foundation for peaceful international relations.16 Lib-
eral economic policy and democratic government were under-
stood to be linked together; or, conversely, centrally-planned
economies and authoritarian governments were understood to
be closely allied - a conclusion which pre-war Europe seemed
to confirm.17
The reconstitution of the international order involved the
imposition of democratic political institutions in Germany and
Japan overseen by Allied representatives, as well as the curtail-
ment of the role of the German and Japanese governments in
13. See ROBERT E. HuDEc, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE
DIPLOMACY 5-7 (2d ed. 1990).
14. See id. at 5-10.
15. See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD PoLTICs FACES ECONOMICS
(1945).
16. Id. See also HAROLD ZINK, AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GER-
MANY 165-86 (1947); infra note 18.
17. The largely American architects of the post-War order had been influ-
enced by the so-called Freiburg School in Germany, whose members included
Franz Boehm, Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Ropke. Friedrich von Hayek, an
Austrian who settled in England, was influential in arguing the case for eco-
nomic liberalism and democratic values in the 1930s and 1940s. Hayek later
emigrated to the United States and became a founder of the libertarian move-
ment. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER
(1948). A just-completed article by David Gerber presents a comprehensive
analysis of the Freiburg School and its impact on American and European pol-
icy. The article notes that much of the important work by the German legal
scholars and economists of the Freiburg School has not been translated into
English. David Gerber, German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the
"New" Europe (copy in author's files). See also DENNIS L. BARK & DAVID R.
GRESS, 1 A HISTORY OF WEST GERMANY, FROM SHADOW TO SUBSTANCE 191-209
(1989); HAROLD ZINK, THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY 1944-1955, at 169-92,
251-68 (1957).
A most notable American study of pre- and post-war industrial policy and
the impact of such policy on political institutions is LASSWELL, supra note 15. A
classic study of democratic values written in the form of a proposal for the
training of lawyers as they returned from the War is Harold D. Lasswell &
Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943), reprinted in MYRES S. McDou-
GAL ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 42 (1987). Myres S. McDougal
and Harold D. Lasswell described and analyzed the threat to democratic values
presented by totalitarian systems of government in The Identification and Ap-
praisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959), re-
printed in McDOUGAL ET AL., id. at 3.
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economic planning.' 8 The forcible democratization of the au-
thoritarian governments and the severe curtailment of the role
of these governments in economic affairs reflected the commit-
ment of American post-war planners to democratic values and to
liberal economic policy.
Because the economic effects of the war were felt through-
out the world, the shaping of global economic stabilization and
growth required a broad plan. Post-war planners recognized the
need to create a stable international financial system to assure
government liquidity and to provide the means for each country
to participate in the new international economy. 19 A stable and
growing international economy required that each state, includ-
ing the underdeveloped countries, be assured of the means to
participate. The International Monetary Fund and Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development were estab-
lished to provide stability and liquidity in world financial
markets as well as to provide funds for development.
The third in the triumvirate of international institutions
planned for the post-war era was to be the International Trade
Organization (ITO). The ITO would have established rules for
the conduct of trade, rules to protect against restrictive business
practices, and an international institution to make decisions and
resolve disputes.2° The ITO Charter was sent to the U.S. Con-
gress for approval in 1949. Hearings were held but the Charter
was otherwise not acted upon. The president withdrew it from
consideration in 1950 and the Charter effort died both domesti-
cally and internationally.2 1 The Charter effort apparently failed
in the Congress as a result of protectionist opposition and a lack
of support by liberal trade proponents who believed that the
Charter did not go far enough.2 2 The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been drafted and signed
as an interim measure to provide a framework for reciprocal
tariff reduction negotiations, took the place of the ITO Charter
18. For Germany, see, e.g., Gerber, supra note 17, at 61-70; BARK & GRESS,
supra note 17, at 191-209; ZINK, THE UNITED STATES IN GERMANY, supra note 17,
at 264-68. For Japan, see, e.g., EDWIN M. MARTIN, THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF
JAPAN 45-92 (1948); KAZUO KAWAI, JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE 34-70, 91-
110, 133-61 (1960); JAPAN'S PROSPECT (School for Overseas Administration,
Harvard University ed., 1946).
19. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILIZATION (M. Shields ed.,
1944), and particularly, The Views of Jacob Viner, id. at 53-68.
20. See HUDEC, supra note 13, at 11-47 (discussing structure and outcome of
ITO negotiations).
21. Id. at 59-61.
22. Id. at 59-60.
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as the legal foundation of the liberal international trading
system.23
The liberal trading system is founded on the economic the-
ory of comparative advantage elaborated by David Ricardo in
1817.24 Ricardo demonstrated that all nations benefit from trade
by specializing in the production of goods and services in which
they are comparatively the most efficient. States which are ab-
solutely the most efficient in the production of all goods and
services, as well as states which are not absolutely the most effi-
cient in the production of any good or service, benefit from the
operation of comparative advantage. As Samuelson and
Nordhaus observe, on a global level all nations benefit from the
effect of specialization as the world economy moves closer to its
production possibility frontier.25 While Ricardo may have been
the first to provide the mathematical model of comparative ad-
vantage, the basic idea that individual states benefit from inter-
national trade by concentrating their productive efforts in areas
of particular efficiency, and by trading with other states for less
efficiently produced goods, is clearly elaborated in Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations.26 Smith was highly critical of distor-
tions introduced into British trade by governmental restriction
in the form of tariffs and quotas, and he faulted the policy of
granting export subsidies.27
It is short-sighted, however, to view the foundation of the
liberal trading system solely through the lens of comparative ad-
vantage. Liberal international trade policy - that is, the policy
idea that individual state governments should not interfere with
the movement of goods and services28 across national frontiers
- relies on the decisions of individual private actors to deter-
mine the sectors in which capital is employed for productive
purposes and relies on the decisions of individual private con-
sumers to determine which goods and services it is in their inter-
ests to consume. National governments retain control over
23. Id. at 49-73.
24. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLUIcAL ECONOMY AND TAX-
ATION 77-93 (1817).
25. PAUL A. SAMUELSON AND WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 898
(13th ed. 1989).
26. SMITH, supra note 1, at 194-95.
27. Id. at 182-239.
28. The author is well aware that GATT rules as presently formulated do
not apply to trade in services. This, however, is a gap in current liberal trade
rules which the Uruguay Round negotiations are undertaking to fill. See Fred-
erick M. Abbott, GAIT and the European Community: A Formula for Peaceful
Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
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domestic economic policy and may, through a variety of tech-
niques such as manipulating fiscal and monetary policy, enhance
or restrict the ability of private actors within the state to employ
capital or consume goods. Governments, however, are limited in
their restrictive capacity by the rules of the liberal trading sys-
tem which limit tariffs and prohibit quotas except in narrowly
defined circumstances, and are required to treat foreign goods
on the same basis as domestic goods.
Adam Smith insightfully observed that the alternative to
private decision making with respect to trade, that is, govern-
ment decision making, is troubling.29 In the first instance, there
is no reason to believe that any government or individual legisla-
tor understands the international trading system and its rela-
tionship to the national economy such that we would believe
that they could control trade patterns in the national interest.
Second, if legislators were to assume the power to manage trade
decisions, we would certainly see expansion of the influence of
business lobbyists vying for special dispensations. It would take
a certain naivete to assume that legislators would suddenly be-
gin to act solely with the general public interest in mind. Third
and finally, government would essentially assume control of the
power to decide what the individual consumer would consume
and to what sectors productive capital would flow. Few consum-
ers are insensitive to price and fewer still are insensitive to
quota limitations. Few producers would elect to direct capital to
an enterprise whose export opportunities were restricted.
The critical message of the Second World War to many of
those who influenced the structure of the post-war order was a
distrust of central government planning.3° The economic poli-
cies of the Axis governments were described by Harold
Lasswell:
In more industrialized countries [referring specifically to Germany and
Japan], the control exercised by a dominant few is chiefly through the
monopoly of violence, propaganda, and administration. Extremes of
riches and poverty may be accentuated; the chasm between upper and
lower [classes] is not filled by middle-income groups. There is a mini-
mum of freedom in the choice of economic activity, in moving from one
job or enterprise to another, in bargaining to settle the terms of work
or trade. Decisions that restrict freedom in the market are made by
despotic, not democratic, procedures. Little effort is made to root out
social, political, and economic discriminations, which are as often used
to play one part of the population against another and to prevent the
29. This text paragraph summarizes some of Smith's observations, supra
note 1, at 182-239.
30. See HAYEK, supra note 17.
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growth of a united and free commonwealth. Let us call this unbal-
anced industrialization or, synonymously, predatory or exploitative
industrialization.
31
Distrust of central government planning bred by the war
strongly pervaded reactions to the economic policies of the So-
viet Union which were rightly perceived as authoritarian. Dis-
trust of central government planning was an essential factor in
the founding of the modern liberal trading system.
There was thus a line from Adam Smith to David Ricardo to
the Freiburg School to the American architects of the post-war
trading system which held that liberal economic policy provided
for the maximum global output of goods and services, and served
to limit government restriction of individual freedom. By the
end of the Second World War, the proximate relationship be-
tween liberal economic policy and democratic values was
apparent.
A liberal trading order, in which comparative advantage
could freely operate, was understood by Adam Smith and those
who followed to have political and social downsides. Each na-
tion open to free competition would be continually adjusting its
internal economy to respond to conditions created by external
forces. Industries unprotected from external competition would
be forced to upgrade plant and equipment or lose market share.
Workers would be subject to dislocation as a result of events be-
yond government control. The trade balance would fluctuate as
the domestic economy responded to changing conditions. All of
these conditions naturally would give rise to demands for protec-
tive measures from those affected. Adam Smith suggested a
gradual approach to the relaxation of trade restrictions so as to
permit manufacturers to reemploy their capital without great
loss. He advocated the repeal of laws restricting the movement
and employment of laborers to enhance their ability to find al-
ternative employment.3 2 Recognizing that the risk of political
and social unrest would inhere in a trading system that produced
potentially rapid internal changes in economic conditions, the
architects of the post-war liberal trading system built in various
31. LASSWELL, supra note 15, at 46. Lasswell observed:
Unbalanced (predatory, exploitative) industrialization, by holding
down consumption, instigates social unrest at home.
The ruling groups in Japan and Nazi Germany, fearful of unrest
among peasants and workers, maintained rigid despotic regimes. They
encouraged war psychology as an instrument of industrial discipline.
(Symbols, in the short run at least, are cheaper than goods).
Id. at 47
32. SMrrH, supra note 1, at 200-01.
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safeguard measures which would enable states adversely af-
fected to take certain remedial steps on a short-term basis.
These measures were not intended to permit calcification of do-
mestic industries, but rather to ameliorate the shock of rapidly
changing conditions.
Liberal trade policy took a greater hold in Europe as eco-
nomic conditions remained depressed in the late 1940s. Euro-
pean and American planners saw the integration of the
European economies as a mechanism for accelerating economic
growth, as well as for enhancing social stability.33 The construc-
tion of production facilities designed to serve a pan-European
market would clearly be more efficient than facilities designed
to serve local markets. Moreover, the founders of the European
Community opened a liberal economic avenue which the archi-
tects of the global liberal trading system could not realistically
open - namely, the avenue of free mobility of persons. On a
global basis, the rigid structure of the nation-state system and
the wide disparity in the distribution of resources made free
movement of persons politically infeasible. The founders of the
Community believed that the nations of Europe were suffi-
ciently compatible on the level of culture and wealth distribu-
tion to permit such movement. Of course, the founders of the
Community had political and social goals above and beyond
those of economic integration, but chose to direct their initial
efforts primarily at the level of economic liberalization of
markets.
In the same post-war time frame, the countries of Eastern
Europe, dominated by the Soviet Union, followed an entirely dif-
ferent political and economic path. In the East both internal and
external economic relations were centrally planned. Political
activity, the movement of individuals and access to information
were tightly controlled. The policies followed by the Eastern
bloc countries represented the virtual antithesis of the liberal
political, economic and trade policies followed in the West.
The disparity in post-World War II development between
the countries of Eastern and Western Europe could hardly be
exaggerated. The countries of Western Europe without excep-
tion evolved into stable and prosperous democracies. Today, the
political institutions of the European Community and the Coun-
33. See GENERAL REPORT, supra note 11. See also Mauro Cappelletti et al.,
Integration Through Law: Europe and the Ameican Federal Experience, A
General Introduction, in 1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw 3 (Mauro Cappelletti et
al. eds., 1986).
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cil of Europe are at the forefront of the protection of human
rights. Germany's constitution prohibits participation by the
military in foreign activity. Intra-Community barriers to trade
and travel have been significantly reduced. A common mone-
tary policy is evolving and the level of interstate political cooper-
ation continues to increase. The twelve European Community
countries and seven European Free Trade Association countries
have preliminarily agreed on enhanced integration and the for-
mation of cooperative institutions.
Meanwhile, the economies of Eastern Europe have dis-
integrated, along with the political and social institutions which
ran them. Eastern Europe faces a dangerous period of social in-
stability as internal and external markets now are liberalized.
Already this instability has evidenced itself in civil war and the
deprivation of human rights on a significant scale. The hope for
1992 is that the disturbances affecting Yugoslavia and Romania
do not erupt on a pan-Russian scale.
The best evidence that the liberal trading system works is
not found in treatises on international economics. It is found in
the growing ranks of countries which have abandoned restric-
tive trade policies in favor of open policies. Acceptance by states
of the rules of the liberal trading system continues to increase as
formal membership in the GATT has exceeded 100 countries,
with more than 25 additional countries applying GATT rules on
a de facto basis. Not only do the former Comecon states seek to
formally join the liberal trading system, but the People's Repub-
lic of China, the final large-scale bastion of central government
economic planning, also expresses its willingness to conform to
the rules of the liberal international trade regime. A number of
Latin American states which had adopted protectionist trade
policies in the 1960s and 1970s abandoned those policies in the
1980s in favor of open markets and achieved dramatic improve-
ments in domestic economic growth rates. Countries through-
out Latin America pursue economic integration and open
markets, with increasing attention to a fully open hemispheric
market. At the same time, democratic government appears to
have superseded military authority in a number of these same
Latin American states.
There are those who question whether the liberal trading
system should receive credit for the expansion of global trade,
successful development in Western Europe, and post-war
growth in the United States. They are preparing to deconstruct
the liberal trading system, presumably with the end of sug-
1992]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
gesting a better model. Viewing the current recession in the
United States and the social ills pervading the country they ask,
"If this is success, what would failure look like?" They will ac-
knowledge that failure looks like the former Soviet Union and
the Eastern bloc, but suggest that the failures there may have
had causes other than authoritarian economic policies. The
longer answer to their question is painfully simple. Failure also
looks like Nazi Germany and pre-war Japan. Failure looks like
Brazil and Argentina during their protectionist periods. Failure
looks like the protectionist policies of India.
Certain countries have succeeded in achieving high eco-
nomic growth rates with neo-mercantilist managed trade poli-
cies. Japan is the most notable example. Japan, however,
embodies a culture wholly different than that of the United
States or Western Europe. The Japanese economy relies on the
sacrifice of its workers to excessively long hours of employment
and extremely limited job and social mobility. The Japanese
government has severely restricted the ability of individuals to
spend their income and savings. Such policies would be socially
intolerable in the West as unjustifiable intrusions on individual
freedom. Moreover, there is growing evidence that Japanese
economic planning cannot shield that country from the effects of
internal and external market forces. Recently, growth has dra-
matically slowed and capital flows have turned inward. The
hyper-inflated real estate market, buoyed by collusive dealing,
may contain the seeds of an economic crisis. The ability of Japan
to outperform the international economy in the long run should
perhaps not be taken for granted.
It may well be that a persuasive textbook case can be made
for substituting managed trade for liberal trade policy. The his-
torical case for centrally-directed economic policy, however, is
terribly unpersuasive on economic, social and political grounds.
II. DEMOCRATIC VALUES
The core values of democracy were identified by Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal in a 1943 article.34 The war years
lent a certain fragility to democratic values in the United States
as large scale government intervention in the economy became a
necessary element of war preparation. Lasswell and McDougal
observed that the overriding value of a democratic society is re-
alization of the dignity of the individual in a community of mu-
34. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 17.
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tual deference. They meant that each human being should be
free to develop and express his or her own personality, con-
strained only by the threat of harm to others. Each human be-
ing should be free to make his or her own decisions, participate
in the decisions of his or her community and hold and express
personal opinions. In order to pursue individual and collective
development, individuals should have access to the information
and knowledge necessary to make informed decisions. They
should be free from government coercion, except as necessary to
prevent harm to others. In a democracy, individuals should be
free from discrimination on the basis of race, sex or religion.
The maintenance of a democratic society requires that individu-
als have access to the minimum level of wealth necessary for
survival and security. A democratic society will thus seek to
avoid extreme disparities in wealth in order to assure an accept-
able minimum standard of living for all.
Liberal trade policy is inexorably linked to the furtherance
of democratic values. In the first instance, the liberal trading
system seeks to promote democratic values by assuring a mini-
mum standard of living for all individuals. Liberal trading rules
maximize the global creation of wealth through the operation of
comparative advantage. By maximizing the global output of
goods and services, the liberal trading system seeks to assure the
economic conditions which are a prerequisite to free society. In-
dividuals deprived of the minimum wealth necessary for sur-
vival and security are deprived of the right to achieve a dignified
existence. Moreover, conditions of intense material deprivation
threaten the minimal social order necessary to maintain demo-
cratic values.
In theory, the liberal trading system should achieve a rea-
sonable distribution of wealth among nations as the operation of
comparative advantage improves standards of living in both de-
veloped and developing states. Unfortunately, the liberal trad-
ing system alone cannot achieve a true, equitable distribution of
resources on a global basis because disparities in wealth among
nations result from natural factors. This fact of nature is aggra-
vated by the nation-state system which limits human mobility.
Reallocation of wealth would optimally take place as a matter of
social choice by the states with a comparative excess of wealth.
In the real world, the liberal trading system has recognized that
developing countries should be accorded trade preferences in-
tended to accelerate their level of development - even though
such preferences reduce aggregate global economic output.
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In the second instance, the liberal trading system promotes
democratic values by minimizing government coercion with re-
spect to individual decision making. While this might be viewed
as a component of the comparative advantage equation, it is also
a value in itself. Freedom from trade restriction provides indi-
vidual consumers in each country with the opportunity to choose
among goods and services from the widest variety of sources.3
Access to the widest array of goods and services enhances the
capacity of individuals to develop and express their own person-
alities. Market access rules likewise enhance the capacity of in-
dividuals to be informed as to the relative performance of their
own economy and to evaluate the effectiveness of their own sys-
tem of production. Open markets facilitate the flow of informa-
tion across borders as trade contacts increase awareness of world
developments. Open markets permit manufacturers and service
providers to make decisions concerning production and distribu-
tion based on actual anticipated demand for their products. In a
planned international economy, the right of individuals to make
choices concerning the production and consumption of goods and
services is limited to the right to choose among options made
available by government authorities.
An international economy managed by national govern-
ments in their own perceived interests will restrict the operation
of comparative advantage by restricting the efficient flow of
goods and services. Competition will be limited and industry
will avoid specialization toward its most productive sectors.
Consumers will pay higher prices for less efficiently produced
goods and services and suffer a decline in their standard of liv-
ing. All nations will suffer economically as productivity falls.
Producers and consumers will lose their freedom of choice. Eco-
nomic activity will move in the direction dictated by central gov-
ernment planners as opposed to the open market. A managed
international economy ultimately will be destructive of demo-
cratic values.
III. THE NEW ERA
As the liberal trading system approaches the twenty-first
century, new realities must be faced. Advances in technology
make each of us aware of the close global interdependence of
national economies as well as the close interdependence of pri-
35. Liberal trade rules seek to assure that foreign goods will have an equal
right of market access alongside domestically produced goods and further seek
to preclude the arbitrary exclusion of foreign goods from access to markets.
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vate individuals and interest groups. Awareness of this interde-
pendence has enhanced our sense of social justice.
Technological development has enhanced our understanding of
the international economic system, though not nearly so well as
we might like.
Liberal trade is an ideal or guiding principle. The guiding
principle is that government regulation of trade should be mini-
mized because it distorts trading patterns which would other-
wise operate to maximize the operation of comparative
advantage. In a more realistic sense, the goal of the liberal trad-
ing system is to prevent governments from using trade policy as
a means of seeking economic advantage. There has never been
free trade in an absolute sense and there never will be. Adam
Smith recognized that in regard to matters of vital national se-
curity the principle of free trade should be sacrificed. He advo-
cated a gradual approach to trade liberalization, and free
mobility of labor at a time when mobility of labor was severely
restricted by domestic regulation. Our conception of social jus-
tice has advanced. The modern concept of the liberal trading
system must be understood to incorporate the achievement of
progressive social goals.
The protection of important social interests now takes pre-
cedence over untrammeled access to markets. The evolution of
a socially aware liberal trade policy is seen nowhere more
clearly than in the European Community. The evolution of the
Community environmental regime illustrates the point.s6 The
Treaty of Rome said nothing about the environment. Nonethe-
less, the Council adopted rules to protect the environment on
the basis that such protection was an essential goal of the Com-
munity. The Court of Justice confirmed this exercise of author-
ity. The member states adopted measures to protect the
environment, some at a highly restrictive level. The Court of
Justice confirmed the right of the member states to restrict free
trade for the essential goal of protecting the environment, pro-
vided that measures are nondiscriminatory and proportional.
The Community ultimately modified its charter to make protec-
tion of the environment an explicit objective and to enhance the
authority of its institutions to take environment-related action.
Liberal trade policy has not been sacrificed. It has been adapted
to meet the changing needs of society.
36. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the Environ-
ment The Evolution of Legal Regimes, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming
1992).
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Advances in technology have fueled a deeper understanding
of how the international trade and economic system functions.
We understand that fiscal and monetary policy can be adjusted
to accelerate or decelerate the growth rate of the domestic econ-
omy in the short run. We understand that the rate of domestic
growth will affect the volume of exports and imports, though
not as to each necessarily to the same extent. We know that an
appreciating currency will generally increase the volume of im-
ports and decrease the volume of exports. We realize that mone-
tary policy can be used to influence the short-term trend in
currency movement, appreciating or depreciating value, lower-
ing or raising the volume of imports and exports. We know that
an increased savings rate will encourage investment, reducing
domestic consumption as well as the volume of consumer im-
ports. We can grasp that protectionist trade measures, by reduc-
ing imports in the short-term, are likely to cause the domestic
currency to appreciate and in the long-term lead to a higher vol-
ume of imports and a lower volume of exports.37 Yet having al-
luded to a few basic assumptions about the international
economic system, the truth is that much of what makes the sys-
tem function as it does is not fully understood.
An important study of the U.S. external deficit was pub-
lished by the Brookings Institution in 1988. This study incorpo-
rated the research of a preeminent group of economists,
including individuals responsible for constructing international
econometric models for the Federal Reserve Board, the Japa-
nese Economic Planning Agency, and the OECD's Economic and
Statistics Department. Each attempted to explain the causes of
the U.S. current account deficit and to develop a model to pre-
dict the future trend of the deficit. The study is illuminating for
a number of reasons, not the least of which is the insight pro-
vided into the state of the economic art. To quote:
Among the proximate factors used by models to explain the exter-
nal deficit, two are overwhelmingly important: strong U.S. domestic
demand growth during a world recession and a relatively feeble recov-
ery abroad, and the large appreciation of the dollar from 1980 through
early 1985. An additional factor that seems to be important, but not
adequately captured by the models, is the debt crisis and persistent
weakness of activity in developing countries, which were important
U.S. markets.
The existence of several factors all working in the same direction,
37. See W. CONDON, PROTECTION AND LIBERALIZATION: A REVIEW OF ANA-
LYTiCAL ISSUES (IMF Occasional Paper No. 54) (1987), at 5-6 (discussing impact
of trade restrictions on currency values).
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tending to widen the deficit, means paradoxically that the deficit is too
easy to explain. The deterioration can be accounted for in different
ways by giving different weights to the various factors.
For example, Helkie and Hooper report that the Multicountry
Model (MCM) of the Federal Reserve Board staff suggests that if U.S.
and foreign GNPs had remained at their 1980 levels, all other things
being equal, about a fourth of the deterioration in the U.S. external
deficit (measured in constant prices) would not have occurred....
Other models give a somewhat different breakdown....
Economists are less secure when analyzing the fundamentals that
drive the proximate determinants of the external deficit. Growth dif-
ferentials between the United States and other OECD countries are
substantially explicable by policy differences, particularly relative fis-
cal policies, which were expansionary in the United States after 1981
and equally contractionary elsewhere. On the basis of actual fiscal and
monetary polices, however, the full models from which the current ac-
count sectors were extracted on average would have predicted only a
half or less of the actual rise in the dollar. No empirical economic
model can successfully explain the remaining appreciation, particu-
larly not the surge in 1984 and the first months of 1985. That failure
means in turn that the models are capable of predicting only half to
two-thirds of the external deficit on the basis of policies alone. The
failure to predict more is essentially a failure to predict exchange rates.
The inadequacy of models in predicting exchange rates could be
interpreted as evidence that the models will understate the effective-
ness of macroeconomic policies in reducing the deficit because they
will understate the policies' exchange rate effects. That inference is
not robust, however, if other factors independent of policy (for exam-
ple, volatile shifts in private sector expectations) significantly deter-
mined exchange rates during the early 1980s and could similarly drive
them in the future.-3
The Brookings Institution study suggests that it is possible
to identify the major factors which cause the current account of
the United States to fluctuate. It is not yet possible, on the other
hand, to isolate individual cause and effect relationships with as-
surance. Moreover, the study suggests that highly indetermi-
nate factors such as private sector expectations may play a
significant role in the fluctuations. This underlines the inherent
difficulty in managing the international trading system. Protec-
tionist measures will not only have the impact of reallocating
domestic resources away from comparatively more productive
sectors, causing a decline in aggregate output and an increase in
prices, but such measures will have secondary effects in the fis-
cal and monetary areas which may be unpredictable. Adam
Smith's distrust of the ability of legislators to manage the British
38. Ralph C. Bryant & Gerald Holtham, The U.S. External Deficit: Diag-
nosis, Prognosis, and Cure, in EXTERNAL DEFICITS AND THE DOLLAR 61-62
(Ralph C. Bryant et al. eds., 1988).
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external trade in 1776 must be shared by those of us contemplat-
ing the ability of the U.S. Congress to manage American exter-
nal trade today. While our collective capacity to understand the
variables affecting international trade flows has improved, so too
has the complexity of the system which we seek to understand.
Evolution in the ability of economists to model the interna-
tional economic system and to make more accurate predictions
regarding the impact of fiscal and monetary policy does not
touch upon the fundamental lesson of comparative advantage
and its specialization effect. It is as true today as it was in 1776
and 1817 that nations which allow free competition will enhance
their overall production efficiency and increase the aggregate
value of the goods and services they produce.
IV. CHALLENGES TO THE LIBERAL TRADING SYSTEM
American presidents in an unbroken line from Franklin
Roosevelt to George Bush have advocated liberal international
trade policies. In the period of these presidencies the U.S. econ-
omy has expanded dramatically and United States citizens enjoy
one of the world's highest standards of living.39 Whether or not
there is a provable direct causal link between liberal trade policy
and U.S. economic growth, there is sufficient evidence in the
global community of states following restrictive trade policy
during the same period and experiencing economic stagnation to
give us serious pause before adopting the latter course. The im-
portance of external trade to the U.S. economy should not be
understated. In 1989, total U.S. GNP was $5.2 trillion.40 Exports
of goods and services accounted for $626 billion (or 12 percent) of
that total. Exports of goods and services in 1989 increased by 11
percent over the prior year. Imports of goods and services in
1989 accounted for $672 billion (or 12.9 percent) of total GNP.
Imports increased by 6 percent over the prior year.41 Total U.S.
merchandise exports in 1991 totalled $422 billion, while total
merchandise imports totalled $488 billion.4 Merchandise ex-
ports in 1991 represented an increase of more than 7 percent
from 1990, while merchandise imports declined by about one and
39. OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS, UNITED STATES, 1989/1990 (1990), at 146-47
(Basic Statistics: International Comparisons).
40. Id. at 7.
41. Id. at 27.
42. U.S. Department of Commerce, Current International Trade Position
of the United States, March 1992, BUSINESS AMERICA, Mar. 9, 1992, at 16-17.
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one-half percent.43 Over the past several years, the growth rate
of U.S. exports has substantially exceeded the growth rate of
U.S. imports, and net export growth has made a positive contri-
bution to U.S. Gross Domestic Product."
The negative U.S. balance of trade is frequently singled out
by members of Congress as a root cause of current economic dis-
tress. By focusing on the dollar size of the trade imbalance, poli-
ticians of course divert attention from the myriad of other
factors contributing to recession. Those other factors, such as
the federal budget deficit, deregulation of the savings and loan
industry, and military spending, are more directly within the
control of the Congress and so perhaps are less compelling
targets. Even so, it painfully oversimplifies matters to suggest
that an excess of imports over exports is a major cause of
recession.
The United States imported $51.5 billion worth of petro-
leum and petroleum products in 1991.45 Those petroleum prod-
ucts were presumably purchased at market prices which
reflected their value to U.S. industry and consumers. Those pe-
troleum products were used in the various productive and non-
productive enterprises in which Americans engaged. There
would have been some greater benefit to the U.S. economy if
those same products were purchased from oil producers who
drilled in Texas and sold in Illinois. More American workers
would have been employed and producers would have generated
some profit. But there would have been nowhere close to $51.5
billion worth of greater benefit to the national public welfare.
U.S.-produced oil would not have generated more energy. U.S.
manufacturers would not have produced better products more
efficiently. United States petroleum reserves would have been
depleted and assets on the national balance sheet dissipated.
What about Japanese cars? Americans don't buy them and
throw them away. We use them. They become part of our capi-
tal stock. Buying American-made cars would employ more U.S.
43. In 1990, merchandise exports were $393.6 billion and imports were
$495.3 billion. Id.
44. OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYs, supra note 39, at 12,25 and 52; U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, supra note 42, at 16-17. The most recent figures from the
Department of Commerce show a continuation of the trend in net export
growth reported in the OECD Survey.
45. U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 42, at 16. Note that the De-
partment of Commerce published two different petroleum import figures for
1991, the second being somewhat lower at $50.4 billion. The Department ac-
knowledged the discrepancy but did not explain it in this publication. Id. at 17.
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workers and generate some profit for American producers.
These factors in isolation would increase U.S. GDP. But if the
Japanese are selling cars which have better wear characteristics
and are cheaper than American cars when all factors are taken
into account, we as a nation also save capital by buying them.
We invest that capital elsewhere. We may have spent $33 billion
on Japanese cars in 1991,4 but we did not lose $33 billion. If we
were smart, we also gained something close to $33 billion worth
of cars, all of which is entered on the asset side of our national
balance sheet. If the Japanese actually sell cars in the United
States for less than they cost the Japanese to produce (or at least
for less than their fair market value) - a charge which is made
from time to time - our capital increase exceeded our expendi-
ture and the national balance sheet improved.
Needless to say, the foregoing observations themselves over-
simplify the effects of a trade imbalance on national welfare.
The Brookings Institution Study suggests some of the complex
issues which must be dealt with in determining those effects.
The U.S. Department of Commerce publishes excellent statisti-
cal surveys of U.S. trade performance and evaluates that per-
formance for its impact on domestic welfare in a variety of
instructive ways.4 7 The point to emphasize is that, while it is
generally better for the American economy if money is spent on
products produced in the United States than if it is spent on
products produced in foreign countries, spending money on
products produced in foreign countries does not necessarily
harm the U.S. economy. Moreover, managed trade policy which
would raise barriers to the U.S. import market inevitably would
cause foreign countries to raise barriers to their markets. Over
the long term, as foreign markets closed to U.S. exports and as
consumer prices in the United States rose, it is inevitable that
the standard of living in the United States would deteriorate.
Persistent trade deficits with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan
and other Asian countries appear to result from two primary
factors. Certain Asian states have achieved a high level of effi-
ciency in the production of various goods such as automobiles
and consumer electronic products and so possess market advan-
tages in selling these products. Consumers in the United States
benefit from this efficiency by obtaining products at a lower cost.
U.S. manufacturers have been forced either to improve their
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES TRADE PER-
FORMANCE IN 1988 (1989).
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own production efficiency or shift the employment of capital
into sectors in which they are comparatively more efficient. In
this regard, the liberal trading market is functioning as in-
tended. The U.S. economy should adapt to foreign competition
and, as productivity increases, trade deficits should be reduced.
Liberal trade policy assumes that industry and labor in each
country will from time to time be displaced as a result of inter-
national competition. A variety of short-term governmental
measures are accepted as necessary to alleviate the shock of such
dislocation. Ultimately, however, the industrial sector must be
prepared to adjust to changing global economic conditions. Bar-
riers to foreign imports would lead to a less productive industrial
sector and undermine the capability of U.S. industry to compete
in world markets.
The human element in the reallocation of industrial re-
sources presents a significant social problem. The long-term
benefits of comparative advantage are of little immediate help or
comfort to displaced workers. Family adjustment assistance is
and will continue to be a necessary component of a humane lib-
eral trading regime. Most important, however, is the obligation
of the political, economic and social system to provide the oppor-
tunity for worker retraining. In Adam Smith's era, the primary
obstacles to the free movement of workers may have been re-
strictive guilds and residence restrictions. The problem of the
modern worker is education and training. Government funds
must be allocated to provide educational opportunities for dis-
placed workers seeking new employment, and taxes imposed if
need be to pay for these opportunities.
Although production efficiency accounts for part of the
trade imbalance in favor of Asian states, unfair trading practices
have also contributed. Japanese markets, for example, appear to
be extremely difficult for U.S. manufacturers and service prov-
iders to penetrate because of structural impediments. While Ja-
pan may nominally comply with accepted international trade
rules with respect to legal barriers to the import of goods and
services, customary local industrial practices and a complex reg-
ulatory framework operationally act as barriers to such imports.
To the extent that the Asian countries which have persistently
high trade surpluses with the United States operationally inter-
fere with U.S. exports, remedial action must be taken. The fis-
cal and monetary policies of these countries should also be
questioned if they are designed to artificially depress the value
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of local currency, thereby depressing real export prices and in-
creasing real import prices.
Optimally, the United States should pursue justified reme-
dial action in a multilateral context so as to enhance the demo-
cratic character of the liberal trading system. In the final
analysis, unilateral action may well be warranted. The key
point, however, is that Asian trading practices which interfere
with U.S. export opportunities and artificially increase U.S. im-
ports are fundamentally inconsistent with liberal trade policy,
whether or not the specific practices at issue are presently the
subject of an express rule of international trade law. The appro-
priate remedy for such unfair practices is not the abandonment
or dismantling of the liberal trading system. The appropriate
remedy is specific measures intended to conform unfair trading
practices to acceptable international standards.
A second challenge to the liberal trading system is the dis-
parity in labor conditions between the industrialized and devel-
oping countries. Liberal trade policy forces workers in the
United States to compete with workers in less developed coun-
tries who are willing to forego social benefits, such as medical
insurance, which are a necessary feature of an acceptable stan-
dard of living in a developed country. This is an extremely diffi-
cult problem to deal with in a global economy characterized by
extreme disparity in the distribution of resources. For the fore-
seeable future, workers throughout the OECD countries will
face a disparity in minimally acceptable working conditions be-
tween themselves and workers in developing countries, particu-
larly with respect to lower end manufacturing employment.
A reasonable solution to this problem is the negotiation of
multilateral agreements on minimum worker standards in addi-
tion to those which have already been negotiated in fora such as
the International Labor Organization. Because of the wide gap
in labor conditions between the developed and developing coun-
tries, multilateral agreements which establish conditions accept-
able to workers in the OECD countries are probably not
achievable in the near term. The optimum solution to this prob-
lem is to improve the productivity not only of U.S. industry, but
also of the providers of social services such as health care. This
will enable the U.S. worker both to earn a reasonable wage and
to receive adequate social services. While erecting import barri-
ers to protect labor benefits may maintain worker standards in
the very near term, the practice is bound to adversely affect the
U.S. economy in the longer term. American consumers depend
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on foreign exporters to provide a range of goods at low prices. A
protected U.S. market will necessarily lead to higher prices and
a reduced standard of living as consumers are forced to purchase
from less efficient suppliers. While there is no ready salve to the
problems faced by U.S. labor groups in an interdependent global
economy, again the case must be made that enhanced education
will increase the comparative value of U.S. labor. Education of-
fers the best hope for improving the standard of living for Amer-
ican workers while at the same time not depriving workers in
developing countries of decent living conditions.
Environmental issues pose another great challenge to the
liberal trading system. A trading system which minimizes re-
straints on the cross-border movement of goods may encourage
manufacturers to seek out least restrictive national regulatory
regimes and to use such regimes as export platforms. States at-
tempting aggressive regulatory protection of the environment
are hampered by the implicit or explicit threat of industry to
move to less restricted areas. Developing countries may become
environmental dumping grounds for the industrial countries.
On a related front, American environmental interest groups lob-
bied successfully for the enactment of legislation designed to
protect non-human species on an extraterritorial basis.4 s A
GATT panel recently decided that such U.S. legislation is incon-
sistent with rules of the liberal trading system, causing great
concern among environmental interest groups.49
There are few areas of social concern as to which states on a
wide multilateral basis have been obligated to adopt minimum
regulatory standards. Private business enterprises have histori-
cally been entitled to seek out minimum regulatory environ-
ments for a variety of motives. It is only when international
concern reaches a certain threshold level of intensity that de-
mands for the imposition of minimum international standards
emerge. Only in the past decade has concern for the environ-
ment emerged on a worldwide basis at a level which has de-
manded the attention of national and international
governmental organizations.
The liberal trading system has the flexibility to respond to
environmental concerns. The liberal trading system has long
48. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat.
1027 (1972) (as amended; codified in part at 16 U.S.C. 1361ff (1988)).
49. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) (GATT panel report), reprinted in 30 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1598
(1991). See Abbott, International Trade Rules, supra note 10.
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recognized the right of states to adopt measures to protect local
environments, so long as such measures are adopted in good
faith - i.e., they are not merely disguised barriers to trade. Ad-
ditional attention to the impact of trade on the environment is
now needed and reform of the liberal trading system is already
under discussion. The optimum solution to environmental is-
sues from the standpoint of the liberal trading system is the ne-
gotiation of international standards on protection of the
environment, since this form of solution tends to limit the ad-
vantages conferred on any particular participant in the system.
A major difficulty which inheres in this solution is that the stan-
dards sought by environmental interest groups in the OECD
countries are objectionable to developing countries because of
their cost. This problem has no easy solution because it calls for
a balancing of the right of individuals in developing countries to
achieve a minimum standard of living against the right of indi-
viduals in developed countries to improve a comparatively high
standard of living.
In the present circumstances, the solution to the problem of
different national priorities with respect to the environment and
disparate levels of development may be best met by following
the model of the Treaty of Rome before amendment by the Sin-
gle European Act.5° States should be permitted to adopt legisla-
tion to protect the environment, even if that legislation restricts
trade, provided that the legislation is nondiscriminatory and pro-
portional to the objective sought. States should be required to
adopt minimum regulatory standards if they have agreed to
those standards. A non-consensual type of institutional arrange-
ment with respect to the establishment of minimum standards,
such as was added to the Treaty of Rome by the Single European
Act in 1987, may be the next phase in the evolution of the global
regime for protection of the environment.
The protection of non-human species is likewise a problem
of global concern which optimally would be resolved through
multilateral negotiation. The absence of a mechanism to protect
environmental interests outside the territorial limits of nations
is a gap in the international legal order which needs to be filled.
Until it is, conflicts such as that involving U.S. legislation to pro-
tect dolphins outside U.S. waters and the interests of other
states in rejecting unilateral assertions of control over global
trade policy will persist.
There is a high level of recognition within the liberal trad-
50. See, e.g., Abbott, Regional Integration, supra note 36.
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ing order of the need to protect the environment and of the com-
peting interests at stake. It seems likely that the solutions to
environmental issues can be found without undermining the
foundations of the liberal trading system.
Finally, critics argue that the liberal trading system is prin-
cipally responsive to private business enterprise. They contend
that the general public interest is ignored in trade negotiations.
There is little doubt that private business lobbyists exert consid-
erable influence over trade negotiators, whether in Washington,
Brussels, Berlin or Tokyo. While executive branch officials in
the United States are appointed to pursue the public interest,
because of the revolving door between government and private
employment there is great pressure on these officials to pursue
the interests of private business enterprise. Since the activities
of private business lobbyists, in the absence of corruption, are
inherently democratic, it would be unwise to attempt to elimi-
nate their efforts. Moreover, it is undeniable that private busi-
ness enterprises have a considerable stake in the outcome of
trade negotiations and that the interests of business may not be
well understood in the absence of representation.
The better solution, and one which has recently been pur-
sued with considerable success, is active lobbying by cohesive
public interest groups. Environmental and labor interest groups
prompted significant changes to USTR negotiating positions
with respect to the North American Free Trade Area negotia-
tions, and these efforts may prove a useful model for the future.
Likewise, environmental interest groups were able to achieve a
significant success in delaying adoption of the GATT panel re-
port regarding the Marine Mammal Protection Act. Interest
group lobbying has become increasingly effective on a global
scale, especially the efforts of environmental and human rights
interest groups. A continuation and intensification of these ef-
forts will affect the dynamic of trade negotiations in the public
interest.51
51. It has long been recognized that concentration of industrial power may
pose a threat to liberal economic policy. Massive concentration of industrial
power represents a threat to individual freedom of choice and the quality of life
of the consumer. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Consumer Protection and the
Antitrust Laws, 40 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT 579, 579 (1976). Just as private business
enterprises have taken on a global character, so too must enforcement of com-
petition laws take on an increasingly global character in order to protect demo-
cratic values.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In any dynamic trading system, conflict will arise between
competing interests. The liberal trading system has repeatedly
demonstrated the flexibility to resolve competing claims
through negotiation and compromise. Social needs such as ade-
quate environmental protection can and will be accommodated
within the conceptual framework of liberal trade policy. Fifty
years of post-World War II history demonstrate that the individ-
ual decisions of private actors within liberal trade structures are
conducive to both long term economic growth and democracy.
Central government economic planning, both before and after
the war, has a nasty record. Where it has succeeded, it has
proven a breeding ground for exceedingly unhealthy govern-
ment policies with respect to individual rights and interests.
Where it has failed it has produced economic and social crisis. It
would be a grave mistake to conclude that the present difficul-
ties confronting the U.S. economy could and should be solved by
intensifying government management of trade flows.
The liberal trading system promotes democratic values. In
the first instance it seeks to maximize the global output of goods
and services. This increases the aggregate wealth available for
distribution. The specialization effect of comparative advantage
inclines each nation to engage in the productive activities which
will tend to maximize its own wealth. In the second instance the
liberal trading system promotes democratic values by emphasiz-
ing the role of individual decision making. A modern conception
of the liberal trading system recognizes that attaining progres-
sive social goals may take precedence over the free movement of
goods and services. The capacity of the liberal trading system to
evolve recommends it as the structural framework for the fu-
ture conduct of American trade.
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